Under the Large Aircraft Security Program, the US Government will have to search your plane before every flight. The TSA will know how often you fly, where you fly, and who goes with you. And yes you have to pay for it. $50 a flight.

GAO releases misguided GA security report, AOPA points out flaws in study

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By AOPA ePublishing staff

The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) recently released report, “General Aviation Security Assessments at Selected Airports,” fails to accurately assess GA security measures, neglects to acknowledge security procedures already in place, and lacks justification for its misguided, broad-brush conclusions, AOPA says.

The report was requested in early 2010 by the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation to study the “security risks posed by unauthorized individuals gaining access to airports with general aviation operations.” The critical flaw with the report, AOPA says, is that it does not accurately assess security risk, which comprises vulnerability, threat, and consequences. The report addresses only vulnerabilities, painting an inaccurate picture of GA airport security.

“When misguided reports find their way into the hands of regulators there can be problems,” said Craig Spence, AOPA vice president of operations and international affairs. “Thankfully Congress and the Transportation Security Administration are much smarter on the subject and will see the report for what it is—a classic misunderstanding of the issues and facts.”

The association had reached out to the GAO numerous times to help provide accurate information but was not included in the process.

The GAO’s misunderstanding runs so deep that the report inaccurately states that the “sole common characteristic of general aviation operations is that flights are on demand rather than routinely scheduled.” It fails to clarify that GA is private, with the pilots and aircraft operators knowing one another at the airport and each person who boards their aircraft, much like a close-knit neighborhood or family carpool.

The GAO studied 13 airports, including three with commercial operations, from April 2010 to May 2011 that met two of five characteristics: public-use airport, located within 30 nautical miles of a population center of at least 1 million people, base to aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds, has at least one runway that is 5,000 feet or longer, and has more than 50,000 annual operations.

AOPA points out that selecting any two of the five characteristics can lead to drastically different airports with different kinds of risk. Based on this approach, analyzing security measures will not assess the level of associated risk. Security measures studied were perimeter fencing; controlled access points; perimeter, access point, and hangar lighting; locked and secured hangars and aircraft; on-site law enforcement or security officials; transient pilot procedures; intrusion detection systems; cameras; passenger, baggage, package, and cargo screening; and back-up power supplies.

While the study looked at TSA-suggested security enhancements, it did not take into account the cost of some of those voluntary measures. For example, the report noted that five GA airports had full perimeter fencing, while five had partial and one had none; two commercial airports had full fencing and one had partial.

“A fence line can cost $1 million a mile, which means it would take tens of billions of dollars to make the upgrades,” Spence said. “Airports simply don’t receive that kind of funding, and the money would be better spent on addressing other threats.”

In assessing these security measures, the GAO did not test the effectiveness of the security, nor assess measures not directly related to physical security, such as pilot background checks or other intelligence-gathering activities. It made no mention of the highly effective AOPA Airport Watch Program or the TSA’s General Aviation Security Program for certain operators of aircraft more than 12,500 pounds max takeoff weight. The report also left out the Large Aircraft Security Program supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking that would address all aircraft over 12,500 pounds. It is currently working its way through review and is scheduled to open for public comment before the end of the year.

By neglecting these security measures and without providing any data as proof, the GAO report concluded that “Larger aircraft, such as midsized and larger business jets, could cause catastrophic damage to structures and pose a greater risk if they are located near major metropolitan areas. Preventing unauthorized access to general aviation airports and aircraft may help mitigate some security risks.”

“The only access issues that the GAO has disclosed is its lack of access to the facts,” Spence said, pointing to a 2009 report from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General. That report says terrorist threats to GA are “limited and mostly hypothetical” and do not merit expanded regulation. In addition, it states, “The current status of GA operations does not present a serious homeland security vulnerability requiring TSA to increase regulatory oversight of the industry.”

If you click on the link, it will take you to the GAO report, and lo and behold, the Chairman of the requesting committee would be none other than our good buddy, Senator Rockefeller (D-WV).  Seems the GAO told him exactly what he wanted to hear.

Your tax dollars at work, what a crock.  Keep up that pressure, elections are coming again, let them know how you feel about your freedom to fly.

Posted: June 24th, 2011 | Author: | Filed under: Uncategorized

If you give them enough time, they’ll put their foot in it…

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Napolitano:  No “Logic” In Profiling Muslim Men Under the Age Of 35

You’re not using good logic there. You’ve got to use actual intelligence that you received. And, so, you might — all you’ve given me is a kind of status. You have not given me a technique for tactic or behavior. Something that would suggest somebody is not Muslim, but Islamic, that has actually moved into the category of violent extremists,” Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said at a forum on U.S. security and preventing terrorist attacks.

“We have ways to make some of those cuts. And they involve the intel that comes in, the analysis that goes on. For example, we often times, for travelers entering the United States, we won’t not do what is called a secondary inspection just because they are a 35-year- old male who appears to be Muslim, whatever that means. But we know from intelligence that if they have a certain travel pattern over a certain period of time, that should cause us to ask some more significant questions than if we don’t.”

The “ways of making those cuts” so far haven’t been all that productive, reference the Christmas Bomber.  Remember, the IED in Times Square was found by a street cleaner, not any of Naplolitano’s minons.

I will give her one credit, doing an enhanced screening of every darkskinned male with an Arabic name would not be cost effective… so why is screening every private aircraft and pilot prior to every flight?

SIMPLE, we’re not noisy enough.  Muslims have CAIR, we have the alphabet group who want to compromise and declare victory.  Sam Graves (R-MO) is right:  THIS IS A BAD IDEA, PERIOD — no compromise required.

Just like thousands and thousands of dark skinned Arabs/Muslims have no intention of doing harm to National Security, 99.9% of licensed pilots in this country have no intention of harming our National Security.  Yet we are going to be faced with extra cost, un-Constitutional scrutiny, and crippling paperwork all because we enjoy a certain hobby or use a specific tool in our business.

CALL, FAX you representative.  Another example of our “great protectors” not having a clue.  I promise you if Muslims were to be targeted, CAIR would be in the news in a heartbeat!

Posted: June 10th, 2011 | Author: | Filed under: Uncategorized